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REPLY ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY
I.

An Owner of Property may become Vicariously Liable for
the Actions of its General Contractor.
Appellee CPB possessed the contractual right and power,

(and exercised same), to accept or reject any subcontractor or
employee selected by Appellee Hales and Warner. In doing so, CPB
became liable under Utah law for the negligence of Hales &
Warner and the death of Jason Smith.
CPB argues (1) under Utah law, a Property owner's
possession of the right to accept or reject any subcontractor or
employee does not, on its own, subject the Property owner to
liability for the negligent acts of its statutory employees; and
(2), even if possession of such a right to choose employees of
subcontractors or general contractors on its own does subject a
Property owner to liability, CPB argues that it never possessed
such a right in the first place. Appellee CPB is wrong on both
elements.
Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 UT 168, 179, 235 P.
884, 888 (Utah 1925) and Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 562
P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977) both hold that u (a)n independent
contractor can employ others to do the work and accomplish
the contemplated result without the consent of the

2

contractee, while an employee cannot substitute another in
his place without the consent of the employer../'

Appellee

CPB criticizes these cases based on their age. Of course,
while the age of a case should be considered in assessing
its precedential value, the longer a case withstands the
test of time, the more solid its precedential value. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60, 1 Cranch 137
(1803) (200 years old and equally authoritative today as it
was the day it was issued). Likewise, Ludlow and Lodge
remain good law and have never been overturned.

In fact, Utah

Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, 114, 985 P.2d
243, 247, cites Ludlow and its exact same above-quoted
language in order to find that a general contractor was the
actual employer of its subcontractor—just as in present
case.

Central to the decision reached in Utah Home Fire

Ins. Co. was the fact that the subcontractor needed to
obtain the approval of the general contractor with respect
to each worker the subcontractor hired:
"Holmes & Narver (the general contractor)
that Green (the subcontractor) obtain its
respect to each worker Green employed. In
occasion, Holmes & Narver prevented Green
particular individual."
Id. at 114, 247.

3

also required
approval with
fact, on one
from hiring a

Further, and being entirely consistent with Utah's legal
history, in Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 342
Utah Adv. Rep. 7, ^10-11, 958 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah App.
1998), this Court once again said "that the difference
between an employee and an independent contractor is: (a)n
independent contractor can employ others to do the work and
accomplish the contemplated result without the consent of
the contractee, while an employee cannot substitute another
in his place without the consent of the employer. Osman
Home Improvement then applied such law to find that a
General Roofing contractor was liable for the injuries of
its subcontractor's employees because the General
Contractor retained the authority to fire roofers, and to
require roofers to obtain its permission before hiring any
assistants.

Id.

Aside from the recent cases cited above, the law of
Utah remains as it always has: a Property Owner or General
Contractor is an employer of its purported independent
contractors and their employees, if the latter cannot
substitute another in his place without the consent of the
former.

A long history exists for this precedent.

See

Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191 (Utah

4

1940),

Luker Sand & Gravel Co, v. Industrial Comm'n, 82

Utah 188, 23 P.2d 225 (Utah 1933). Appellee CPB's argument
ignores eight decades of Utah Supreme Court precedent and
seeks to impose an alternative analysis.
Appellants' acknowledge that Appellee CPB's cited case
Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 55-6,
923 P. 2d 1383, 1385, (Utah 1996) establishes whether an
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties
depends on whether the alleged employer had the right to
control the employee.

The "right to control the employee"

is determined in Glover by analyzing several factors which
include:
1. (W)hatever covenants or agreements exist concerning
the right of direction and control over the employee;
2. the right to hire and fire;
3. the method of payment (i.e., wages versus payment for
a completed job or project); and
4 . the furnishing of equipment.
The court states that the intent of the parties and the
business of the employer may be considered, in addition
to compensation, direction, and control and that no
single factor is completely controlling. However, the
court has consistently held that whether an employeremployee relationship exists depends upon the
employerfs right to control the employee.
Id.

at 1385-1386.

Appellee fails to address the legal holdings of the six
above-cited cases in their brief or how they remain good
5

law despite Glover.

Nonetheless, this Court must reconcile

Glover with the Supreme Court Cases cited above.
In this case, Glover stands for the proposition that when
CPB met the factors outlined above, then they retained control
over their employees Hales and Warner, Brent Reynolds and Egbert
Construction and became liable for Jason Smith's death. However,
Ludlow, supra

stands for the proposition that even if the other

factors of Glover were somehow not met, (Appellant argues below
that they were satisfied), CPB still became the employer of
Hales & Warner, when they retained and exercised the right to
reject any of the subcontractors or employees Hales & Warner
might have wished to substitute in its place.

This is because

no employee may substitute another in its place without the
consent of its employer.
Both Ludlow, supra,
Ludlow, supra,

See Ludlow,

supra.

and Glover, can be reconciled if

is interpreted to demonstrate, as it expressly

says, that the right to hire and fire is the sine

qua non of an

independent contractor. Without that power, the sine

qua non,

an

entity cannot be an independent contractor. With that authority,
an entity might be an independent contractor, or might not. The
Glover factors must be analy2!;ed to make that determination.
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The situation in Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., supra

(a

post-Glover Utah Supreme Court case), bears a striking
resemblance to the issue presented to the Court by the case
at bar. In Utah Home Fire Ins. Co. case, the general
contractor held the right to refuse its subcontractor from
hiring employees or other subcontractors. The same was true
in Qsman Home Improvement, supra.

In the case at bar,

Appellee CPB admits that "CPB retained the right to refuse
to allow a subcontractor to do work on the project."
Appellee's brief at 35.

CPB's contract provides as

follows:
B. The Contractor shall not contract with any
Subcontractor who has been rejected by the Owner.
The Contractor will not be required to contract with
any Subcontractor against whom it has a reasonable
objection1.
C. If the Owner refuses to accept any Subcontractor
proposed by the Contractor, the Contractor shall
propose an acceptable substitute to whom the Owner
has no reasonable objection.
D. The Contractor shall not make any substitution for
any Subcontractor which has been accepted by the
Owner and the Architect without the prior written
approval of the Owner and the Architect2.
See Brief of Appellant, Exhibit 2, Section 5, 5.1 (BD ) . Footnote comments and bold added.
1

In the converse, CPB clearly requires here that Hales & Warner, et. al.
shall work with any subcontractors that CPB chooses so long as Hales & Warner
does not have a reasonable objection.
2
This language is identical to the critical language from Ludlow supra. See,
Qsman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 1 10-11,
958 P.2d 240, 244 (Utah App. 1998).
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Comparing Section 5.1 (D) of the contract in this case,
to the language of Osman Home Improvement, demonstrates
that Hales & Warner was clearly an employee, not an
independent contractor, of Appellee CPB:
An independent contractor can employ others to do the
work and accomplish the contemplated result without the
consent of the contractee, while an employee cannot
substitute another in his place without the consent of
the employer.
Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Commfn,342 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7, 1J10-11, 958 ~ p - 2 d 240, 244 (Utah App.
1998)(emphasis supplied).
As an employer, CPB became vicariously liable for the
negligent actions of its general contractor, Hales & Warner.
II.

Appellee CPB is Liable for Work-place Injuries to
Employees of Sub-Subcontractors Because CPB is an Owner
of Real Property who Contracts with a Contractor to
Construct a Building on the Owner's Property.

There are at least two circumstances in which an owner
of property, like CPB, may become liable for the injuries
of subcontractor employees.,

Under the first circumstance,

CPB may become liable for Jason Smith's death if they
retained control over the work of their general contractor.
See Thompson v. Jess, 1999 Utah 22, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999).
Under the second circumstance, CPB would become liable
8

because Utah Law imposes a duty on a possessor of land
(CPB) to warn an invitee (Jason Smith) about two general
types of hazards: (1) those that are present on the land
when the invitee enters which the possessor should expect
the invitee will not discover or realize; and (2) those
that the possessor creates after the invitee's entry; and
that the possessor of land (CPB) breached that duty.

See

Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, 74 P.3d 628 (2003).
1.

CPB is liable for Jason Smith's Death Because CPB
"Retained Control" (The First Circumstance).

In Utah, employees covered by Worker's Compensation,
like Jason Smith, can sue third parties, like CPB, for
their negligence. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 states that
injuries or deaths caused by wrongful acts or neglect of
persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of
employer; may entitle the injured or family of the deceased
to maintain an action for damages against the third person.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 (4) specifically provides that
such an action may be maintained against the following
persons who do not occupy an employee-employer relationship
with the injured or deceased employee at the time of the
injury or death:

a subcontractor, a general contractor, an

9

independent contractor, a property owner, or a lessee or
assignee of a property owner.

CPB is a property owner.

For example, Utah Code Ann. § 34a-2-106 would have
allowed an injured employee-plaintiff of a general
contractor to bring a civil action for negligence against a
defendant subcontractor, because the subcontractor was
considered a third party subject to suit by the statute.
Shupe v. Wasatch Electric, Co., 546 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah
1976).

Nonemployers may be sued for common law damages for

injuries to workers caused by the negligence of the
nonemployer,

Ghersi v. Salazar, 251 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 883

P.2d 1352, 1355 (Utah 1994).

The Supreme Court has held

that an injured subcontractor employee could sue the
general contractor for the general contractor's negligence.
Riddle v, Mays, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 780 P.2d 1252 (Utah
1989).

In Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 110 Utah Adv. Rep.

3, 777 P. 2d 428 (Utah 1989) 3 , the Court ruled that under
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 [now renumbered as § 34a-2-106] a
worker can recover against those persons who might be his
or her statutory employers under § 35-1-42 [renumbered as §

In Pate, an injured plaintiff-employee of a sub contractor to a sub
contractor was allowed to sue the defendant general contractor and the
general's subcontractor (the one that employed plaintiff's subcontractor) for
negligence.
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34a-2-103]. The Pate Court concluded that "the legislature
has in clear and unmistakable language evinced an intention
to allow suits by an injured worker against those persons
who might be his or her statutory employer as defined in §
35-1-42 [renumbered as 34a-2-103]4.

Pate at 431. Only the

immediate, or common law, employer, who actually pays
compensation, and its officers, agents, and employees are
shielded by the exclusive remedy immunity conferred by Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-60 [renumbered as § 34a-2-105].

Id.

In a case similar to the case at bar, the Supreme Court
found that where an injured employee plaintiff was employed
by a subcontractor who provided Worker's Compensation
benefits to that plaintiff, the plaintiff was still allowed
to bring a claim for negligence against the defendant
general contractor because they had not been required to
pay plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits and that the
latter does not partake of the immunity afforded by Section
35-1-60 [renumbered as 34a-2-105].

Bosch v. Busch,110 Utah

Adv. Rep. 6, 777 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1989).
4

Furthermore, the 10th Circuit also holds that as a result of the 1974
amendments to Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, the Utah legislature has in
clear and unmistakable language evinced an intention to allow suites by an
injured worker against persons who might be his or her statutory employer as
defined in § 35-1-42 [renumbered as § 34a-2-103]. Goheen v. Yellow Freight
Sytems, 32 F.3d 1450, 1453 (10th Cir, 1994).

11

The policy behind this law is that the state worker's
compensation act should no longer be construed to provide
tort immunity to statutory employers who have not been
required to pay benefits thereunder to the injured worker.
Lamb v. W-Energy, Inc., 884 F.2d 1349, 1349 (10th Cir.
1989).

Utah's exclusive remedy provisions in the Worker's

Compensation Act did not extend to statutory employers who
had not in fact been required to pay workers' compensation
benefits to an injured plaintiff-employee.

Snyder v.

Celsius Energy Co., 866 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (D. Utah 1994) .
Thus, a property owner like CPB5 may be liable once
Appellants establish CPB's negligence.
Nonetheless, Utah adheres to the general common law
rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not
liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or
omission of the contractor or his servants. Thompson v. Jess,
1999 Utah 22, |13, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1999). The scope and
limits of Thompson was briefed and argued extensively in
Appellants primary brief, and Appellants endeavor not to restate
those arguments. However, Appellants briefly address the issues
raised in Appellee CPB's brief and response argues as follows:

5

CPB did not pay Jason Smith's worker's compensation benefits.
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The general rule of Thompson recognizes that one who
hires an independent contractor and does not participate in
or control the manner in which the contractor's work is
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the
manner or method of performance implemented.

Id. However,

the owner of property will be liable if they retained
control.

The retained control doctrine is a narrow theory

of liability, applicable in the unique circumstance where
an employer of an independent contractor exercises enough
control over the contracted work to give rise to a limited
duty of care, but not enough to become an employer or a
master of those over whom the control is asserted.

Id. at

515, 326. There was a genuine issue of material fact with
regard to whether the Appellee CPB could be liable under
Thompson theory.
In addition, if CPB, as a land owner, retained control
over their general contractors, and failed to take
reasonable care to protect its contractor's employees, then
CPB can be held liable. The Worker's Compensation Act will
not act as a bar to recovery by Plaintiff.
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965), one
who employs an independent contractor to do work which the

13

employer should recognize as likely to create, during its
progress, a peculiar or unreasonable risk of physical harm
to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject
to liability for physical harm caused to them by the
absence of such precautions if the employer (a) fails to
provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such
precautions, or (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to
provide in some other manner for the taking of such
precautions. Thompson, at 1(252, 328. There is a genuine
issue of material fact with regard to whether the Appellee
CPB could be liable under § 413, and the trial court erred
in dismissing the Plaintiffs' case.
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965), one
who employs an independent contractor to do work which the
employer should recognize as likely to create during its
progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless
special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to them by the failure of the
contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such
precautions, even though the employer has provided for such
precautions in the contract or otherwise. Thompson, at 1(2 9,
329. There is a genuine issue of material fact with regard

14

to whether the Appellee CPB could be liable under § 416,
and the trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs'
case.
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 (1965), one
who employs an independent contractor to do work involving
a special danger to others which the employer knows or has
reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or
which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when
making the contract, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to
take reasonable precautions against such danger. Thompson,
at 129, 329. Again, there is a genuine issue of material
fact with regard to whether the Appellee CPB could be
liable under § 427, and the trial court erred in dismissing
the Plaintiffs' case.
From Thompson, we know that if CPB retained control
over any part of the work, then they subjected themselves
to liability for Jason Smith's death when they failed to
exercise their control with reasonable care.

But, we also

know that CPB will not be liable for Jason Smith's death
unless CPB actively participated in the performance of the
work. Thompson defines active participation as when an

15

employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over,
the manner of performance of the contracted work.

Active

participation occurs, for example, if CPB directs that the
contracted work be done by use of a certain mode or
otherwise interferes with the means and methods by which
the work is to be accomplished.
Here, CPB retained complete control over its
contractors through its contract with Hales & Warner.
Brief of Appellants, pages 39-44, (identifying facts).
Hales & Warner could not even substitute another contractor
in its place without CPB's permission. Brief of Appellants,
page 41, (identifying facts in paragraphs h, i, and j).
CPB actively participated in the work done by leaving for
itself several of the intricate, detail jobs to be done by
CPB on its own. Brief of Appellants, page 42, at paragraph
1. CPB also interfered in the framing process (the same
process in which Jason Smith died) by dictating how high
specific framed walls would be and what the specific
methods for framing were.
paragraph m.

Brief of Appellants, page 13, at

Finally, once CPB retained control, they

failed to exercise their powers and authority in a
reasonable way, because they did absolutely nothing to stop

16

the unsafe work conditions that led to Jason Smith's death.
Brief of Appellees, page 9, at paragraph 23.

CPB knew of

these unsafe work conditions that killed Jason Smith,
because CPB received daily reports.

Brief of Appellants,

page 14, at paragraph o.
2.

CPB is Liabile Because it Failed to Warn its
Invitee, Jason Smith, (The Second Circumstance).

"...Thompson contains no analysis with regard to the duty
owed by a possessor of land to an invitee."

Hale v.

Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240, note 2, 74 P.3d 628 (2003). A
duty is imposed on a possessor of land to warn an invitee
about two general types of hazards: (1) those that are
present on the land when the invitee enters which the
possessor should expect the invitee will not discover or
realize; and (2) those that the possessor creates after the
invitee's entry. Id. at 19, 630.
The open and obvious danger rule remains viable in Utah
law governing a homeowner's duty to an invitee.
supra,

Hale,

at 19, 630. A possessor of land is subject to

liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he: (1) knows or by
the exercise of reasonable care would discover the

17

condition, and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees; (2) should
expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
or will fail to protect themselves against it; and (3)
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against
danger.

Id. at Hl2, 631. A possessor of land is not liable

to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any
activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or
obvious to them.

Id. at Hl3, 631.

Ther€> are significant exceptions to the open and
obvious danger rule which can, in some cases, limit the
protection the rule affords to landowners.

Hale, supra,

at

1115, 631-632. A possessor of land is not liable to his
invitee for physical harm caused to them by any activity or
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm
despite such knowledge or obviousness. Id. However, there
are cases in which the possessor of land can, and should,
anticipate that a dangerous condition will cause physical
harm to an invitee notwithstanding its known or obvious
danger. Id. at P15 and 632.

In such cases the possessor is

not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes

18

to the invitee for his protection.

Id. Such reason to

expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers
may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to
expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted6, so
that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget
what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against
it. Id.

Such reason may also arise where the possessor has

reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter
the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in
his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the
apparent risk.

Id.

The existence of exceptions to the open and obvious
danger rule avoids the rigidity of the traditional commonlaw rule by permitting the courts to hold that a
plaintiff's knowledge of a danger does not necessarily
absolve the occupier of liability, and permits a plaintiff
to recover if it appears and is found that a risk was one
which would not be anticipated or appreciated by the
invitee, or where the landowner can and should anticipate
that the dangerous condition will cause harm to the invitee
6

For example, Jason Smith was distracted on CPB's jobsite because Jason Smith
was told to work as fast as he could, or risk being fired. Jason was never
given any training on how to work safely. Brief of Appellants, page 14, at
paragraph q.

19

supra,

notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. Hale,
at note 3.

Hence, the open and obvious danger rule is not

necessarily a strict all-or-nothing rule. Id.
From Hale, we know that a duty is imposed on CPB, a
possessor of land, to warn an invitee, Jason Smith, about
two general types of hazards: (1) those that are present on
the land when the invitee enters which the possessor should
expect the invitee will not discover or realize; and (2)
those that the possessor creates after the invitee's
entry. Also from Hale, a possessor of land becomes subject
to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, he: (1) knows of, or by the
exercise of reasonable care would discover, the condition,
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such invitees; (2) should expect that they will not
discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect
themselves against it; and (3) fails to exercise reasonable
care to protect them against danger.
CPB is a possessor of land and therefore owes a duty to
its invitees.

In this case, CPB was informed regularly

through daily reports of the status and condition of its
jobsite by its statutory employee Hales & Warner.
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Brief of

Appellants, page 14, at paragraph o; page 40, at paragraphs
d-e.

Hales & Warner knew that Egbert Construction was

hiring untrained, young and inexperienced workers to work
with dangerous framing walls.

Brief of Appellants, page

12-13, at paragraphs h-1; page 15-16, at paragraph t.
Hales & Warner knew this because they told their statutory
employee Egbert Construction to get proper supervision for
their young and inexperienced workers.

Brief of

Appellants, pages 15-16, at paragraph t. Hales & Warner
kept CPB informed daily on everything that took place on
the construction site.
paragraph o.

Brief of Appellants, page 14, at

Moreover, Hales & Warner, was CPB's statutory

employee and CPB's agent on the job site.

See Brief of

Appellants, pages 37-48. Therefore, whatever Hales & Warner
knew, must also be imputed to CPB, because "under
longstanding Utah law, the knowledge of an agent concerning
the business which he is transacting for his principal is
to be imputed to his principal."

Wardley Better Homes &

Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 516, 61 P.3d 1009, 1014
(Utah 1999).

Even if this Court rejects the notion that

Hales & Warner is not CPB's statutory employee, CPB held
constructive and actual knowledge that unsafe, untrained
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and young workers were working with dangerous framing
walls.

Brief of Appellants, pages 12-16,

This was a

dangerous and hazardous condition occurring on CPB's land
prior to and during when Jason Smith came on CPB's land.
From receiving daily reports and being on site, CPB knew
this when Jason Smith arrived on the job site.

Id.; See

Also Brief of Appellants, page 14, at paragraph o; page 40,
at paragraphs d-e.

Neither CPB, nor Hales & Warner ever

took any action to prevent the inexperienced and young
workers from working with the dangerous framing walls.
Brief of Appellee CPB, page 9, at paragraph 23.
Smith died as a result.
at paragraphs q-r.

Jason

Brief of Appellants, pages 14-15,

Because of his inexperience and

ignorance, the danger to Jason Smith on CPB's land was not
known or obvious to Jason Smith.

Brief of Appellants, page

14, at paragraph q. However, CPB held the knowledge and the
power to stop work on the job site in order to ensure the
safety of the men and women working there.

Brief of

Appellants, page 41, at paragraph i. CPB remains liable for
Jason Smith's death.
Thus, there exist two, or more, recognized theories of
liability, supported by facts in the record, that authorize and
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require Plaintiffs' case to proceed. Under the first theory, CPB
retained control over its general and sub contractors and
therefore became responsible for the contractors' negligent acts
that killed Jason Smith. Under the second theory, CPB knew that
its contractors were operating an unsafe construction site and
that those contractors were performing dangerous activities—
namely using untrained, unsupervised workers to erect inherently
dangerous framing structures.

Despite knowledge of these

dangerous activities, CPB did nothing, and admits it did
nothing, to protect Jason Smith once he was invited onto CPB's
land.
II.

Jason Smith died as a proximate result.

Appellee is Liable Because it Retained Control Over the
Work Both by Contract and by Conduct.
Appellants argue in the Brief of the Appellants, pages 39-

46, that liability may be imposed by virtue of the contractual
rights alone, without respect to whether those rights were
exercised. Appellants note that the additional affirmative acts
committed by Appellee CPB, as noted above, in addition to the
terms of the contract, give rise to liability under the retained
control doctrine
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III. CONCLUSION
The district court erred when it granted the Appellees'
respective motions for summary judgment.

Questions of law still

remain for a Utah jury to decide and this Court should reverse
the trial court and instruct it to deny the motions and allow
Appellants' case to proceed for trial on the merits.
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